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Abstract
Face recognition algorithms have demonstrated very high
recognition performance, suggesting suitability for real world
applications. Despite the enhanced accuracies, robustness of
these algorithms against attacks and bias has been chal-
lenged. This paper summarizes different ways in which
the robustness of a face recognition algorithm is chal-
lenged, which can severely affect its intended working. Dif-
ferent types of attacks such as physical presentation at-
tacks, disguise/makeup, digital adversarial attacks, and mor-
phing/tampering using GANs have been discussed. We also
present a discussion on the effect of bias on face recogni-
tion models and showcase that factors such as age and gender
variations affect the performance of modern algorithms. The
paper also presents the potential reasons for these challenges
and some of the future research directions for increasing the
robustness of face recognition models.
Introduction
Face is one of the most commonly used and widely ex-
plored biometric modality for person authentication. Re-
cent advances in machine learning, especially deep learning,
coupled with the availability of sophisticated hardware and
abundant data, have led to the development of several face
recognition algorithms achieving superlative performance
(Parkhi, Vedaldi, and Zisserman 2015; Amos et al. 2016).
Due to the advancements, automated face recognition sys-
tems are now utilized in several real world scenarios rang-
ing from photo tagging in social media, photo organization
in mobile devices to critical law enforcement applications
of missing person search and suspect identification. While
recognition accuracy is one of the key metrics to evaluate
the effectiveness of a face recognition model, its robustness
with respect to different types of data variations must also
be evaluated.
Robustness of a face recognition algorithm refers to its
ability to handle intentional and unintentional variations in
the input space. Figure 1 presents illustrative class bound-
aries learned by a face recognition model for three classes.
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Figure 1: An illustration where a face recognition algo-
rithm learns the decision boundary to classify/identify three
classes/subjects. The singularities between the boundaries
give rise to the vulnerable points.
The data points which are in-between boundaries (i.e. ma-
roon crosses) can potentially be used to challenge the ro-
bustness of the algorithm (intentionally or unintentionally).
Intentional variations refer to the samples/variations intro-
duced by an adversary which attempts to attack a face recog-
nition algorithm for obtaining unauthorized access. For ex-
ample, robustness of a recognition algorithm can be af-
fected by different kinds of impersonation techniques such
as spoofing or disguise variations. On the other hand, unin-
tentional variations refer to the changes brought to the input
image without the intent of fooling the system. For example,
variations due to unintended occlusion, disease correcting
facial plastic surgery, and images captured across different
characteristics such as ethnicity and gender.
This research presents an overview of different techniques
which challenge the robustness of a face recognition algo-
rithm, along with the potential solutions provided in the
literature. As part of this research, the variations observed
by a face recognition system have broadly been catego-
rized as: (i) robustness due to external adversary (i.e. at-
tacking face recognition algorithms) and (ii) robustness with
respect to bias. As mentioned earlier, an adversary can cre-
ate data variations to fool the face recognition system and
this can be accomplished either via (a) physical attacks or
(b) digital attacks. Physical attacks refer to the techniques
where changes are made to the physical appearance of a face
before capturing an image. Presentation attacks, variations
due to disguise/make-up, and intentional plastic surgery are
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(a) Presentation Attack using Mask
(b) Disguise Accessories used for Obfuscation and Impersonation
Figure 2: Face recognition systems are susceptible to phys-
ical attacks, where physical modifications are made to the
face, such as (a) presentation attack and (b) variations due to
disguise accessories.
some of the key techniques for physical attacks. Digital at-
tacks refer to the changes made in the captured face image,
which can result in a different output from a face recog-
nition system as compared to the original image. For ex-
ample, adversarial attacks such as the Universal perturba-
tion (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017) or the l2-attack (Car-
lini and Wagner 2017), as well as the variations brought
due to morphing/re-touching/tampering (Yuan et al. 2019;
Scherhag et al. 2019). Finally, robustness with respect to
“bias” has also been studied in this research. Biased behav-
ior of models is a relatively recent area of research which
has garnered substantial attention due to its widespread im-
pact in the society. The inability of a recognition model to
perform well for a particular subset of the population has
caused concern in the community. Therefore, there is a need
for an in-depth understanding of the biased behavior shown
by the face recognition algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the
next section elaborates upon the physical attacks, followed
by a section on the digital attacks. A discussion on the ro-
bustness of face recognition models with respect to different
biases are discussed thereafter, followed by the path forward
for future research.
Robustness Against Physical Attacks
Physical attacks refer to the variations brought to the
physical-self before capturing the input data for a face recog-
nition system. In terms of a face recognition pipeline, modi-
fications are performed at the sensor level, such that a modi-
fied face image is acquired by the recognition system. A face
recognition system can be attacked with the intention of im-
personating another individual (in order to obtain unautho-
rized access) or obfuscating one’s identity. As demonstrated
in Figure 2, generally physical attacks can correspond to: (i)
presentation attacks, (ii) disguised faces, and (iii) variations
due to plastic surgery. The following subsections elaborate
upon these physical attacks in terms of the associated litera-
ture and implications.
Presentation Attacks
According to the ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics 2016
Standards, presentation attack (Figure 2(a)) can be defined
as “an alteration in the face acquisition system with the in-
tention of modifying its intended working”. As mentioned
earlier, the aim of presentation attacks can be two fold: (i)
impersonation: where an attacker wants to acquire the iden-
tity of someone else for illegal access and (ii) obfuscation:
where the person wants to hide his/her own identity. In the
literature, Marcel, Nixon, and Li (2018) showed that face
recognition systems are vulnerable against various presen-
tation attacks ranging from cost-effective 2D photo medi-
ums to sophisticated 3D silicone masks. The first public
2D photo print-attack database, namely the NUAA photo
imposter (PI) database, was released in 2010. Later, Print-
Attack (Anjos and Marcel 2011), CASIA-FASD (Zhang et
al. 2012), and Replay-Attack (Chingovska, Anjos, and Mar-
cel 2012) databases were developed to showcase the chal-
lenging nature of these physical attacks. The above-listed
databases, focusing only on 2D presentation mediums, gen-
erally suffer from texture loss, image quality, and Moire´ pat-
terns. To overcome these limitations and with the advance-
ment in 3D technology, 3D masks are deployed to attack the
face recognition system. Both commercial and deep learn-
ing based face recognition systems are found vulnerable
towards such presentation attacks. In 2017, Manjani et al.
(2017) prepared the first silicone mask attack database con-
taining videos captured in unconstrained settings using var-
ious YouTube links. In total, the database consists of 130
videos of the real face and people wearing a silicone mask.
Later, several other databases have been prepared showcas-
ing the challenging nature of 3D mask attacks.
In the literature, several image features based algorithms
have been developed to detect presentation attacks (Gal-
bally, Marcel, and Fierrez 2014; Ramachandra and Busch
2017). The image features based algorithms can be grouped
in pre deep learning era and post deep learning success.
The pre deep learning algorithms are generally based on
hand-crafted features: either texture features, motion fea-
tures, image quality features, or the combination of them.
In the post deep learning era, architectures such as deep-
dictionary learning, convolutional neural network (CNN),
and long short-term memory (LSTM) have been applied for
feature extraction and detection of presentation attacks. For
instance, Manjani et al. (2017) presented a novel detection
algorithm using multiple level dictionary learning. The error
rate of the proposed algorithm is 6% lower than the then
best performing algorithm on the proposed silicone mask
database in the seen setting. On the other hand, in open-set
testing, the error rate of the proposed algorithm is at least
17% less than existing algorithms1.
1Generally, PAD algorithms suffer from low generalizability,
where the defense might work perfectly on a seen database and
seen attack but fails under unseen settings. The scenario is popu-
larly referred to as open-set, where during test, the defense algo-
Face recognition systems are not limited to operate in day
time under the visible spectrum; they are also deployed to
operate in the infra-red spectrum (night time). Agarwal et al.
(2017b) presented the first-ever multi-spectral video-based
face presentation attack database. Real and presentation at-
tack videos are captured in the visible (VIS), near infra-red
(NIR), and thermal spectrum. Presentation attack medium
includes 3D latex masks and 2D hard resin masks of fa-
mous celebrities. Face recognition experiments performed
using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) system and hand-
crafted texture features show that the performance of the
system drops when attack videos are provided for recog-
nition. Further, to secure the system from presentation at-
tacks, several existing texture-based feature extractors are
implemented. It is found that presentation attack detection is
highest in the thermal spectrum and lowest in the NIR spec-
trum. The best performance is obtained by the combination
of multi-resolution decomposition from wavelet and tex-
ture features via a gray-level-co-occurrence matrix (GLCM)
(Agarwal, Singh, and Vatsa 2016). This was followed by a
novel feature aggregation based presentation attack detec-
tion algorithm for 2D and 3D attack mediums (Siddiqui et
al. 2016). After performing the motion magnification to en-
hance the micro patterns in the videos, a linear SVM clas-
sifier is trained over texture and motion features separately,
followed by score-level fusion.
Recently, new concerns have been raised regarding the ro-
bustness of face recognition systems. The PAD algorithms,
which are used to protect the face recognition algorithms,
are also vulnerable to attacks and unseen distribution sam-
ples. Agarwal et al. (2019) showed that a face recognition
system can be made vulnerable by tampering the feature ex-
traction block of PAD algorithms. A convolutional autoen-
coder based mapping has been learned to map the features of
fake class to the feature distribution of real class. Given the
vulnerabilities, it is our belief that future research should fo-
cus primarily on developing (i) robust PAD algorithms and
(ii) universal detectors (Mehta et al. 2019) capable of han-
dling multiple attacks.
Disguise and Make-up
Face recognition systems are often presented with the chal-
lenge of recognizing disguised faces (Figure 2(b)). Dis-
guised face recognition is accompanied with the inherent
characteristic of intent. Disguise accessories can be used
intentionally or unintentionally to obfuscate different face
regions. Intentionally, disguise accessories can be used to
impersonate another person in order to gain unauthorized
access. Disguise accessories can also be used to obfuscate
one’s identity by hiding certain face parts. Similarly, usage
of accessories such as sunglasses, hats, or scarves also result
in unintentional disguised faces. The combination of differ-
ent types of disguises, their usage, and varying intent, results
in vast variations observed in disguised faces, which often
tend to challenge the robustness of face recognition systems.
The AR Face dataset (Martinez and Benavente 1998) is
one of the initial datasets containing face images with dis-
rithm is provided with images of unseen database or attack.
guise variations. It contains images pertaining to 126 sub-
jects, captured in constrained settings with a fixed set of dis-
guise accessories (sunglasses and scarves). The dataset has
served a pivotal role in promoting research on disguised face
recognition; however, the constrained nature of the dataset
resulted in algorithms achieving high recognition perfor-
mance very quickly (almost 95% (Singh, Vatsa, and Noore
2009b)). The AR Face dataset was superseded by other more
challenging datasets, which facilitated research in the di-
rection of disguised face recognition. In 2013, the IIITD In
and Beyond Visible Spectrum Disguise database (I2BVSD)
(Dhamecha et al. 2013) was released for understanding and
evaluating disguised face recognition in the visible and the
thermal spectra. The dataset continues to be one of the sem-
inal datasets for evaluating face recognition systems under
disguise variations. In 2014, Dhamecha et al. (2014) com-
pared human performance and machine performance for the
task of disguised face recognition on this dataset. The al-
gorithm proposed by the authors identified disguised facial
regions, and performed person recognition using the non-
disguised facial regions only.
Up till 2016, most of the research on disguised face
recognition involved face images captured in relatively con-
strained settings. Wang and Kumar (2016) presented a Dis-
guised and Makeup Faces Dataset containing 2460 face im-
ages of 410 subjects. The dataset contains images collected
from the Internet with variations across different disguise
accessories and makeup. In 2018, the Disguised Faces in the
Wild (DFW) dataset (Singh et al. 2019b) was released as
part of the International Workshop on DFW held in conjunc-
tion with CVPR2018. The DFW dataset is a first-of-its-kind
dataset containing 11,157 face images of 1,000 subjects. It
is the first dataset to contain multiple images for each sub-
ject, along the lines of normal, validation, disguised, and
impersonator. Recently, the concept of the DFW dataset
is further extended and the DFW2019 dataset (Singh et al.
2019a) is presented as part of the DFW2019 competition at
ICCV2019. This includes additional sets of plastic surgery
and bridal makeup. While the top performing teams in the
competition demonstrated high verification performance at
higher False Acceptance Rates (Deng and Zafeririou 2019;
Singh et al. 2019a), analysis of the submissions demonstrate
low performance (less than 10% True Acceptance Rate) at
0% False Acceptance Rate; a metric often used in stricter
settings such as access control in highly secure locations.
The key observation formed in the two competitions is that
impersonators are the most difficult subset.
Plastic Surgery
Plastic surgery is another covariate of face recognition
which challenges the robustness of automated recognition
systems. Plastic surgery is often performed to modify face
parts such as the nose, eyes, lips, ears, or bone structure.
Post surgery, an individual can demonstrate large perma-
nent variations in the face shape or different facial regions,
thereby resulting in low intra-class similarity. In 2009, plas-
tic surgery was established as a challenging covariate for
face recognition, which required dedicated research atten-
tion (Singh, Vatsa, and Noore 2009a). In 2010, the first pub-
licly available plastic surgery dataset was released (Singh
et al. 2010) containing pre and post surgery images of 900
subjects. The dataset continues to be the only available
dataset for this problem, which is still heavily used by the
researchers across the world.
The release of the IIITD Plastic Surgery dataset insti-
gated the development of several face recognition algo-
rithms capable of handling variations due to plastic surgery
(Nappi, Ricciardi, and Tistarelli 2016). Bhatt et al. (2013)
proposed a multi-objective evolutionary granular algorithm
for matching faces before and after plastic surgery. The al-
gorithm demonstrated improved recognition performance as
compared to the then state-of-the-art results. Marsico et al.
(2015) proposed region-based strategies for face recognition
under variations due to plastic surgery. Suri et al. (2018) pro-
posed a COST framework (COlour, Shape, and Texture) for
matching pre and post plastic surgery face images. For de-
tecting faces which have undergone plastic surgery, a Mul-
tiple Projective Dictionary Learning based technique has
been proposed, followed by a face verification pipeline uti-
lizing the information from the altered and non-altered re-
gions (Kohli, Yadav, and Noore 2015). A high accuracy of
almost 98% is achieved in the plastic surgery detection task.
Recently, the DFW2019 competition (Singh et al. 2019a)
has also contained a protocol for recognizing images under
plastic surgery variations, where deep learning based base-
line algorithms show around 50% verification accuracy at
0.01% False Acceptance Rate. It is our belief that the avail-
ability of these face datasets will enable deep learning based
face recognition systems to encode the covariate of plastic
surgery and improve the results.
Robustness Against Digital Attacks
Digital attacks correspond to the variations introduced in the
acquired image before presenting it to the face recognition
system. With the availability of several image modification
tools, it has become relatively easy for attackers to digitally
modify a face image. As shown in Figure 3, generally, digital
attacks can broadly be classified into: (i) adversarial attacks
and (ii) alterations - morphing/re-touching/tampering. The
following subsections elaborate upon each type of digital at-
tack and its related literature.
Adversarial Attacks
Despite the high classification performance obtained by
deep learning techniques (Majumdar, Singh, and Vatsa
2016; He et al. 2015; Silver et al. 2016), they are highly sus-
ceptible to changes in the input space (Figure 3(c)). Szegedy
et al. (2014) demonstrated the vulnerabilities of CNN mod-
els by introducing a minute noise or perturbation in the in-
put image. Karahan et al. (2016) have shown that deep face
recognition algorithms are susceptible to image degradation
based effects such as Gaussian noise, contrast, blur, and
facial part occlusions. It is also observed that the accura-
cies of GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al. 2015) and VGG-Face
(Parkhi, Vedaldi, and Zisserman 2015) degrade with color
balance manipulation. Dabouei et al. (2019) have perturbed
the face images by manipulating various facial landmarks,
Figure 3: Digital attacks: (a) morphing, (b) retouching, (c)
adversarial perturbation. In each row, image(s) in blue box
represents the real image, and remaining are attack images.
and demonstrated that geometric attacks are more than 98%
successful on the state-of-the-art face recognition networks.
Goswami et al. (2018) showed that several commercial
and deep CNN based face recognition algorithms are vul-
nerable towards different adversarial attacks at (i) image-
level and (ii) face-level. In the extended work (Goswami
et al. 2019), the authors proposed two defense algorithms:
(i) adversarial perturbation detection algorithm utilizing the
intermediate filter maps of a CNN, and (ii) a mitigation al-
gorithm for recognizing adversarial faces. To mitigate the
effect of adversarial noise, the most affected filter maps
of a CNN model are selectively dropped out, and match-
ing is performed using the unaffected filter maps. In an-
other work, Agarwal et al. (2018) demonstrated that the
attacks performed using image-agnostic perturbations (i.e.,
one noise across multiple images) can be detected using a
computationally efficient algorithm based on the data distri-
bution. Further, Goel et al. (2018) developed the first bench-
mark toolbox of algorithms for adversarial generation, de-
tection, and mitigation for face recognition. Recently, Goel
et al. (2019) presented one of the best security mechanism,
namely blockchain to protect against attacks on face recog-
nition. Layers of CNN are converted into blocks similar
to blocks in the blockchain. Each block contains the data,
hash function, public and private cryptographic keys to iden-
tify any possible tampering. The proposed network is re-
silient to any kind of tampering including modifications to
the CNN weights. While defense against adversarial sam-
ples of utmost importance, researchers have also focused
on evaluating the adversarial robustness of a model (Carlini
et al. 2019). It is our belief that going further, researchers
should focus more on understanding the cause of adversaries
(Gilmer et al. 2019), and providing robust defense mecha-
nisms (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018).
Morphing, Re-touching, and Tampering
Ferrara, Franco, and Maltoni (2014) first demonstrated the
vulnerability of commercial face recognition systems to-
wards morphed faces. Agarwal et al. (2017a) generated the
first video-based morphed face database using the popu-
lar social messaging application, Snapchat. The database
contains videos of 129 unique subjects. Further, the effect
of face morphing is demonstrated using a commercial face
recognition system and in-built iPhone face unlocking sys-
tem. It is observed that both the systems are unable to pro-
tect themselves from morphed images. Recently, Majumdar
et al. (2019) performed an enhanced study on face morph-
ing through two operations: (i) morphing two identities by
blending as per a certain amount, and (ii) by partially re-
placing a particular part of the face from a different identity.
The vulnerability of two deep face recognition algorithms,
OpenFace (Amos et al. 2016) and VGG-Face, are evaluated
on the tampered database. Blending and replacement of the
eye region show the highest impact in the recognition perfor-
mance, and both the networks demonstrate a drop of at least
30%. Further, to protect the integrity of these algorithms, a
novel Siamese detection network is proposed which utilizes
the RGB and high pass filtered images for tamper detec-
tion. Jain, Singh, and Vatsa (2018) proposed an algorithm for
detecting synthetic face images generated using StarGAN
(Choi et al. 2018). A support vector machine classifier is
trained for binary classification over the softmax probabili-
ties given by the CNN network.
Similar to morphing, facial retouching is an important
application, particularly in the fashion and beauty product
industry. In 2016, Bharati et al. (2016) prepared one of
the most extensive facial retouching based database. The
authors demonstrated that retouched face images can de-
grade the matching accuracy of the commercial system by
up to 25%. A deep Boltzmann machine based model was
proposed for detecting retouched images. The proposed ar-
chitecture is able to perfectly detect the existing makeup
based retouched images. In the follow-up work (Bharati
et al. 2017), the face retouched database was extended
by covering multiple demographics regions. A novel semi-
supervised network is also proposed for the detection of
makeup and retouched images, which shows superior per-
formance compared to existing algorithms.
Recently, GAN based techniques such as the FSGAN
(Nirkin, Keller, and Hassner 2019) have shown to gener-
ate seemingly real content, making it challenging even for
humans to identify fake images. Moreover, the rise in Deep-
Fakes (Amerini et al. 2019; Li and Lyu 2019) and other so-
phisticated morphing techniques demands robust solutions
for detection of fake content.
Robustness Against Bias
Another less explored yet crucial field for assessing robust-
ness of face recognition systems is their invariance to the
(a) Racial bias in existing face
recognition system.
(b) Age bias observed in face
recognition models.
Figure 4: (a) Recent incidents have demonstrated bias in face
recognition algorithms. (b) Nagpal et al. (2019) have demon-
strated bias due to race and age in deep learning models.
presence of bias2. Recently, multiple incidents have high-
lighted the presence of bias in existing machine learning
based systems for face analysis. Amazon’s face recogni-
tion software, Rekognition, despite being easy to use, made
an erroneous prediction for 28 members of the Congress
and confused them with images of publicly available mug-
shots. Moreover, even though only 20% of the members
of Congress are people of color, almost 40% of the false
matches belonged to them (Figure 4 (a)) (Wong 2019). In the
literature, Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) demonstrated the
biased performance of three commercial software for gender
classification. These algorithms performed poorly on dark
skinned females as compared to lighter skinned males. The
authors also introduced a new database, Pilot Parliaments
Benchmark (PPB), which was labeled using the six point
Fitzpatrick scale for skin color. Based on this labeled data,
further analysis was performed with respect to skin tone of
the subject to study the bias in existing systems.
Following these observations, researchers have presented
techniques to mitigate the effect of bias in face analysis
tasks. A joint learning and unlearning framework (Alvi, Zis-
serman, and Nellker 2018) has been proposed for eliminat-
ing bias from CNN models for age, gender, race, and pose
classification from face images. A joint loss is used to opti-
mize the network. The primary loss focuses on the task of
classification, while the additional loss enforces the learnt
representations to be invariant to the secondary task, and
the variations in the data. Ryu, Adam, and Mitchell (2018)
proposed the Inclusive FaceNet model, which utilized trans-
fer learning to learn attribute prediction models for various
subgroups across gender and ethnicity. Multi-task Convo-
lutional Neural Network (MTCNN) (Das, Dantcheva, and
Bremond 2018) is another framework, which is proposed
to learn unbiased feature representations. It jointly learns to
predict the gender, ethnicity, and age from the input. Joint
learning results in improved learning across sub-groups
which reduces the biased behavior of the model towards a
particular sub-group. Another research thread to mitigate
learning biased representations involves pre-processing the
data to obtain fair representations. Amini et al. (2019) pre-
sented a pre-processing technique to de-bias face detection
2As per the Oxford dictionary, bias is defined as the inclination
or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way
considered to be unfair.
algorithms. The algorithm learns the latent structure of the
training data with respect to the ethnicity and gender of the
subject via variational autoencoders, which is later utilized
to re-weight samples in order to obtain fair representations.
Limited research has focused on understanding the effect
of bias in face recognition. Recently, we have (Nagpal et al.
2019) presented a first-of-its-kind in-depth analysis of bias
in deep learning based face recognition algorithms. We have
analyzed deep learning models for the existence of bias with
respect to the race and age of individuals (Figure 4(b)). It is
observed that similar to humans, deep learning based face
recognition models appear to undergo the phenomenon of
“own-race” and “own-age” bias, where they suffer a drop in
accuracy while recognizing individuals of a different race
or age than those seen during training. Feature visualiza-
tions further demonstrate an inherent bias in deep learning
networks, wherein they appear to focus on race-specific dis-
criminative facial regions. These findings suggest an imme-
diate need for researchers to focus on eliminating bias from
face recognition models in order to develop fairer systems.
Discussion
Deep learning based face recognition models may have
achieved very high performance on “seen” distributions and
learnt to predict the unseen classes under certain variations,
they still show poor generalizability on unseen variations.
This singularity can be exploited by an adversary to attack
the models or can unintentionally yield biased decisions.
For example, attacks such as adversarial perturbations, deep-
fakes, morphing/tampering using GANs, and silicone masks
based physical presentation attacks have already been used
to fool face recognition models. Future research directions
should focus on two important aspects: (i) developing meth-
ods to compute the robustness level of an algorithm which
assess if the algorithm would show biased behavior and (ii)
developing robust defense mechanisms to build trustworthy
face recognition systems. Finally, the research community
will benefit from novel databases and benchmarking pro-
tocols focusing on identifying the singular points of face
recognition algorithms.
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